A few weeks back, as part of this ongoing conversation on checks and balances, we took a comparative look at the salient aspects of the Legislature’s ability to oversee and provide checks on Executive power (see Part 1 by Clicking Here). At the time, we used the world’s most popular democracy, the United States, as the benchmark (so to speak).

But as that article, published in the July 9^th issue of The Reporter, made clear, the goal should not be to carbon copy the USA’s presidential system. The goal, instead, is to ask at least two fundamental questions: (a) what are the Parliamentary system’s analogous features that provide oversight of the Executive, and (b) how do Belize’s systems stack up next to the equivalent Parliamentary benchmarks.

Now, at this point, I wish to make it abundantly clear that the Parliamentary systems use most of the same oversight tools as do other governance systems (presidential, semi-presidential, etc). Actually, allow me to quote from Transparency International’s publication dubbed “Overview of Parliamentary Oversight Tools and Mechanisms” (hereafter Transparency International 2022) which states:

“Most parliamentary oversight tools are relevant to all systems of government. The difference in applicability of tools is minimal. For instance, votes of no confidence are available mainly in parliamentary systems whereas presidential systems rely on the tool of impeachment. The frequency in the use of oversight tools, however, may to some extent depend on the system of government. For example, parliamentary systems generally see more frequent use of tools such as questions and debates, due to the fact that the executive sits in parliament, which holds significant political control over the government’s survival. This is less common in presidential systems where the executive is less dependent on the support of parliament for survival”.

(Transparency International 2022)

The quote above speaks to “frequency in use,” but it is also valuable to underscore the difference in “impact” of certain tools when used in different systems.

For example, consider the “vote of no confidence.” It is possible for a USA-styled presidential system to see their legislature put forward a “No Confidence” motion; however, as a 2016 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report—(written by Legislative Attorney Jack Maskell and Congressional Specialist Richard Beth), entitled “Congressional Censure and ‘No Confidence’ Votes Regarding Public Officials”—explains the use of “no confidence” in the USA’s structure would be mostly symbolic.

On this point, for instance, Maskell and Beth wrote:

“Adoption of a resolution expressing a lack of confidence could have symbolic effects as an expression of the sense of Congress (or of either house). A vote expressing “no confidence” of the Senate or the House in a particular official of the government, while it may certainly have political implications, would have no specific legal import.”

On the other hand, in Parliamentary systems, a “No Confidence” vote, as was mentioned in an earlier Res Publica360, can trigger the removal of the Prime Minister and possibly triggers a new General Election. This is because, unlike the presidential system, the head of government in a Parliamentary structure draws his power from the Legislature, while an executive president is directly elected by the people.

The Genre of Tools

At this point, there is utility in establishing the type of tools available to Parliamentarians. As Transparency International (2022) and scores of other sources explain, Parliamentary oversight tools can be classified into, at least, three general categories: (i) Political Control, (ii) Financial Oversight, and (iii) Legislative Scrutiny.

The first category—Political Control—is the focus of this week’s Res Publica360. “[Political Control] refers to tools and mechanisms used by parliaments to politically constrain executive power through checks that can hold the executive to account. These include questions, summons, interpellations, vote of no confidence, motions of censure, and impeachment,” explains Transparency International (2022).

Questions

This oversight tool is possibly the most commonly used in Parliamentary system, and it is literally as the name implies: It is the ability of legislators (Members of Parliament) to hold government officials (including ministers of government) accountable by asking oral or written questions.

Answering questions is obligatory. However, it is not just the answer that is mandated, but there is an expectation that the response to the question must be satisfactory. In terms of “written questions,” it must be noted that—speaking of Parliamentary systems in general—“unsatisfactory response from a minister to a written question submitted by an MP [Member of Parliament] may even lead to an interpellation and later a vote of no confidence if they fail to provide a satisfactory answer within a certain period”—(Transparency International 2022, 10).

Brief Intermission: Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Indicators for Democratic Parliaments

It is useful for me to pause here to highlight a useful “tool.” The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (along with partnering organizations) has created an extensive index called the “Indicators for Democratic Parliaments.” The IPU’s set of indicators can be broken down as follows: It covers two targets with seven sub-targets. Each sub-target is further broken down into 25 indicators, each with specific sub-indicators called dimensions. In total, the index has 111 dimensions.

As an example, there is Sub-target No. 1: Effective parliament. This sub-target has 11 indicators (e.g., Ind 1.1—Parliamentary Autonomy, Ind 1.2—Members of Parliament, and Ind 1.7 Oversight). Each of these eleven indicators has its own dimensions (or sub-indicators). For example, Indicator No. 1.7 (Oversight) has seven sub-indicators (also known as “Dimensions”), one of which is Dimension 1.7.5—Questions.

Dimension 1.7.5 (“Questions”) is further broken down into assessment criteria for which a Parliamentary system’s laws and Constitution can be reviewed as to the degree that this tool is allowed to be effective.

Among those 111 dimensions, there is Dimension 1.7.5: Questions. This Dimension 1.7.5 falls under the IPU’s sub-target “Effective Parliament” and sets out benchmarks for what constitutes a sound system for Questions to carry their full weight as an oversight mechanism.

For instance, Assessment Criterion No. 1 asks whether there is a “Constitutional or legal framework for the right to ask questions.”

More precisely, this assessment criterion set by the IPU reads:

“[There needs to be] a constitutional or legal framework [that] provides for a clear right of members of parliament to pose oral or written questions to the government and ministers, who are then obliged to respond in a timely and full manner. Failure to provide answers to written questions sent by MPs can result in sanctions for ministers/executive representatives.”

IPU (2022)

The IPU’s assessment tool then allows reviewers to rate this component on a six-part Lickert scale from “Non-existent” (could be codified as zero) to “Excellent” (could be scored at 6).

Now, in Belize, there is the use of “Questions,” as it is provided for in the Standing Orders. The current Leader of the Opposition has undoubtedly used this particular parliamentary tool. The tool could be used by all members of parliament—especially the Opposition and backbenchers—who are not bound by “collective responsibility.”

Who Determines Sanctions?

However, please note the latter part of Assessment Criterion No. 1: “Failure to provide answers to written questions sent by MPs can result in sanctions for ministers/executive representatives.” This brings me back to Transparency International (2022)’s quote:

“Unsatisfactory response from a minister to a written question submitted by an MP [Member of Parliament] may even lead to an interpellation and later a vote of no confidence if they fail to provide a satisfactory answer within a certain period.”

Who determines whether the question has been answered “satisfactorily”? Second, what sanctions follow in Belize’s system should it be declared an unsatisfactory reply? And, finally, if declared unsatisfactory, what sanctions exist in Belize’s system?

The Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (see Reference No. 4 below) does delineate the process for asking questions. It does detail what questions can and cannot be asked (see Rule 20, “Content of Questions). It even explains at Rule 21 the “Manner of Asking and Answering Questions.” However, the Standing Orders remain ambiguous regarding the precise sanctions if someone fails to adequately respond to a question.

It is possible to argue that this is provided for via Rule 91 (1) to (3) of the Standing Orders, as these speak to the “General Authority of the Speaker.” Section 91(1), for its part, states that “The Speaker shall have the power to regulate the conduct of business in all matters not provided for in these Standing Orders.”

Rule 91(2) goes on to essentially say that the Speaker’s decisions in this regard are final.

Returning to IPU’s Dimension 1.7.5’s assessment criterion, which speaks to responses being given in “full manner” and possible sanctions where unsatisfactory replies are given, there would appear to be a lacuna in Belize’s legal structure when it comes to even this most basic tool of Parliamentary Oversight.

And, while this entire series of articles are framed within the backdrop of a Constitutional reform process, please note that the remedy for this ostensible weakness in our system of governance could have been addressed at the Standing-Orders level via a simple amendment (as was recently done to create the Joint Public Accounts Committee).

That said, I guess it cannot hurt to have the fix to this gap inserted into the Constitution; however, its inclusion depends on whether or not the Belizean people actually demand it. This implies, then, that somewhere our People are being made aware of these oversight tools, which may or may not be mentioned clearly in the Constitution itself.

To Be Continued

Clearly, this topic can become quite involved. For this week’s Res Publica360, I will pause at the first rung of Parliamentary oversight tools: Questions. But please recall that I said above that under the first genre of tools (Political Control), there are also Summons, Parliamentary Committees, Interpellations, Motions, Committees of Inquiry, Censures and Votes of No Confidence, and more.

Moving forward, we will review each of these via the lens of the IPU’s Indicators for Democratic Parliaments and Transparency International (2022)’s (among other references) to provide a type of “gap analysis” of areas where Belize’s system—even as it remains a Parliamentary system—could be strengthened. In the meantime, I do leave the references below with you, as there is only so much that could be covered in a newspaper column.

References:

Duri, Jorum, Fabianno Angélico, Cristiano Ferri, and Jean-Patrick Villeneuve, “Overview of Parliamentary Oversight Tools and Mechanisms,” Transparency International, (November 2022), https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/product/overview-of-parliamentary-oversight-tools-and-mechanisms.

Maskell, Jack, and Richard Beth, “Congressional Censure and ‘No Confidence’ Votes Regarding Public Officials,” Congressional Research Service, (June 23, 2016), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL34037.pdf. 

Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Indicators for Democratic Parliaments, based on SDG targets 16.6 and 16.7,” IPU (April 2022), https://respublica360.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/18ba3-compiled-version-2022-04-1428129.pdf

“Standing Orders of the House of Representatives,” National Assembly of Belize, http://www.nationalassembly.gov.bz/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Standing-Orders-of-House-of-Representatives.pdf